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Abstract 
We draw upon the socioemotional wealth perspective and agency theory to investigate 
how family involvement in management influences firm growth. Using a sample of 1,397 
Spanish, small, high-tech firms, we classify three different types of firms: family firms 
managed by family-CEOs, family firms managed by non-family CEOs, and non-family 
firms. Consistent with our expectations, we show that firms managed by family-CEOs 
have less firm growth in comparison with the other two groups. When the family firm is 
managed by non-family CEOs, the presence of another family member in the Top 
Management Team (TMT) has a negative impact on firm growth. Finally, we found that 
founder-led family firms have better firm growth than descendant-led family firms. 
Consequently, our research contributes to a deeper understanding of the relationship 
between family management and growth. 
1. Introduction
There is a long debate about the relationship between family ownership and firm growth 
(Saridakis, et al. 2018). Some authors support a positive effect of family ownership on 
growth, because the owners of family businesses act to ensure the continuity or longevity 
of the enterprise (Miller et al., 2008). Other scholars portray a more negative picture of 
family businesses, arguing that their difficulties in growth and survival are attributed to 
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resource restrictions (Grassby, 2000), conservative strategies (Allio, 2004), and family 
conflicts such as succession difficulties (Schulze et al., 2003). 
However, although there are many research studies about differences between family and 
non-family businesses in terms of growth, existing literature has overlooked the diversity 
of family firms and their heterogeneous behaviours. Most studies tend to study family 
firms as a homogenous form of organization, and several scholars have recently called 
for more nuanced insights about the drivers of heterogeneity among family firms 
(Chrisman & Patel, 2012; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2013). In particular, one of the reasons 
why family firms are different is family involvement in management positions (Pittino et 
al. 2019; Hambrick, 2007; Hambrick & Mason, 1984). Particularly, the management of 
the company may have a greater or lesser amount of family participation. That is, family 
firms, on one hand, could be led by a family CEO or a non-family CEO, and on the other 
hand, the top management team could be composed of family as well as non-family 
managers (Klein, Astrachan & Smyrnios, 2005).  
The purpose of the present study is twofold. Firstly, differences between family and non-
family firms are analysed in terms of growth. We examine the crucial role of family 
ownership and leadership by considering the more nuanced effects of CEO identity 
(family or non-family) (Miller, Minichilli & Corbetta, 2013). Based on this, we classify 
three types of firms: family firms managed by family-CEOs, family firms managed by 
non-family CEOs, and non-family firms. Building on prior research, we conceive 
different kinds of family firms in terms of their emphasis on current family control and 
the importance they place on non-economic or socioemotional goals in their decision-
making. 
Secondly, we study in depth the heterogeneity of family businesses and try to close the 
gap by exploring the effect of family involvement on small firm growth. One of the most 
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important sources of heterogeneity lies in the fact that family members occupy upper 
echelon positions (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). We integrate the socioemotional wealth 
perspective (SEW) and the agency theory into a coherent model to develop consistent 
theoretical explanations on how family involvement in management, and its combination 
with the Top Management Team (TMT) and the generational stage of the firm, affect 
business growth. They help us provide a more complete picture of the reasons why family 
control of a firm will be beneficial or harmful for family firms. Specifically, we explore 
how the extent the level of family involvement in management (Chirico and Bau, 2014) 
influences firm growth. From the agency perspective, it is known that family firms have 
lower agency costs. However, this effect may be offset by the costs of family 
management. Family managers are not recruited from the general market of managers, so 
they are usually less trained than professional managers, and this leads to worse firm 
outcomes. From the SEW perspective, we also study how family involvement weighs 
differently the balance between the economic and non-economic goals giving place to the 
mixed gamble approach (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2014a). Thus, we suggest that family firms 
differently balance the value of business growth’s benefits and costs depending on the 
degree of family involvement (Bauweraerts et al. 2019; Alessandri et al., 2018). This 
induces either positive or negative consequences for firm growth. In this sense, we 
analyse the possible influence of two factors on the growth of a company. Both factors 
modulate family involvement on the firm. They are more likely to affect the family’s 
preferences for SEW or financial wealth (Sciascia et al., 2014), and as a consequence, 
they could have different influences on firm growth. The first one is the presence of family 
members in the TMT. The second one is the generational stage of the firm, that is, if the 
CEO is the founder of the firm or is any descendant. 
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Given the heterogeneity and diversity of family businesses, we have chosen a very 
specific sample where we can study the differences in leadership within a homogeneous 
group of family businesses. We test our hypothesis used a sample of 1,397 small firms 
operating in high- and medium-high technology sectors. The companies in the high-tech 
sector constitute a differentiated group with respect to other industrial sectors, presenting 
a specific growth profile. However, if we deepen the analysis within that group and in 
that same stratum of size (less than 50 employees), we still observe notable differences 
that we believe can be explained, in part, by issues related to ownership and the presence 
of family members in positions of management responsibility. Consistent with our 
theoretical arguments, our findings suggest that the presence of non-family CEOs in 
family firms results in a significant increase in a firm’s growth. However, non-family 
CEO’s do not always outperform. When these non-family CEOs are in the presence of a 
family TMT, there is a negative influence on firm growth. Finally, founder-led family 
firms will show higher firm growth than descendant-led family firms. 
 
Thus, our contributions to the existing literature are both theoretical and empirical. 
Theoretically, we add additional insights about the drivers of heterogeneity among small 
family firms on firm growth, addressing recent calls for more nuanced views of how 
socioemotional wealth and agency theory considerations drive strategic behaviour in 
family firms (Chrisman et al., 2015; Chua, Chrisman & De Massis, 2015). Exploring 
differences among family firms regarding leadership, management, and generational 
involvement, our paper also responds to unceasing calls to study behavioural differences 
within family firms (Chua et al. 2012). Empirically, by incorporating considerations of 
different types of family firms, we reconcile contradictory findings regarding the level 
family involvement in family firms (in particular, family membership of the CEO), the 
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top management team, and the generational stage – underlying different advantages and 
disadvantages in family firms’ growth. Lastly, our research context offers a unique 
opportunity to expand existing research in small Spanish family businesses. We 
contribute to the debate on the difficulties of the Spanish economy, focusing on the role 
of family management in explaining low firm growth. In addition, most previous research 
has been conducted on large listed firms and has not addressed small firms, whose context 
may be particularly different in terms of growth. 
The paper is organized as follows: In the next section, we discuss the implications of the 
family involvement on the firm and develop testable hypotheses. Section three describes 
in detail the sample and the measurement of variables. Section four provides the results 
of the empirical analyses conducted to tests the hypotheses. The final section discusses 
the results and summarizes our findings. 
 
2. Theoretical framework 
Enterprise growth has been studied by researchers for many years (Gupta, Guha & 
Krishnaswami, 2013); it is especially important in small enterprises. In fact, the survival 
of small firms essentially depends on their ability to coexist with other relatively bigger 
competitors. The entrepreneurship approach is one which has analysed the growth 
phenomenon of small businesses. The main motivation is that most of these small 
companies are not able to expand during their life span (Davidsson et al., 2010), and they 
are not even able to grow (Doern, 2009). Authors such as Brush, Ceru, and Blackburn 
(2009) have shown that some firms do not have any intention to grow and others want to 
grow slowly, but at the same time, they try to be as profitable as big firms. This 
phenomenon of the growth of small firms is very complex and further research is needed 
6 
 
in order to see how growth decisions are affected by the context and by the role of 
entrepreneur (Wright & Stigliani, 2012). Regarding family firms, there are controversial 
findings about the relationships between family ownership and firm growth, especially in 
small businesses (Hamelin, 2013, Nordqvist et al., 2008). 
One of the facts that characterize the Spanish business structure is the high presence of 
small and medium enterprises (SME). This is the reason why the Spanish context is 
particularly suitable for the study of small firms. More than 99% of companies belong to 
this stratum that accounts for 74% of employment. Concern about the low survival of this 
type of company and the difficulties for growth of those that survive are on the agenda of 
public decision-makers. Forty percent of Spanish SMEs do not survive the first three 
years of their existence. This figure is particularly worrying and it rises to 60% if we refer 
to small companies or to 75% if we refer to micro-enterprises. According to data from the 
OECD, Spain is the country with the second lowest survival rate of its SMEs. Only a 
small group of SMEs can be considered High Growth Firms in the sense of having grown 
well above the average of their industrial sector in the last three years. In addition, the 
presence of family businesses in the small business segment in Spain is so large that it is 
not possible to talk about small businesses without mentioning that the vast majority are 
family businesses. According to the latest report of the Family Business Institute (2015), 
family businesses represent 88.8% of the companies in Spain. This data varies according 
to the size and industrial sector of the companies. Within the microenterprises, family 
businesses represent more than 90% of the businesses. However, above this size, the 
family business represents 79.5% of the businesses. Thus, most SMEs are family 
businesses, and a large majority of family companies are SMEs. This is why addressing 
small business growth is particularly relevant in the family business context. 
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In this paper, we use two different perspectives: agency theory and the SEW approach. 
Both reveal evidence for and against the benefits of family involvement. Taking into 
account the differences between owner-management and non-owner management, 
agency theory would predict a positive effect on firm value, because owner-management 
aligns the interests of owners and managers (Jensen and Mechling, 1976). Nevertheless, 
this effect could be negative if we consider the costs of family management. Family 
managers are usually not recruited from the general market for managers. They are part 
of the family, and they are not always properly trained to lead the business. This situation 
generally leads to quality differences between family managers and professional 
managers, and this may reduce a firm’s performance. In addition, family-managed firms 
tend to be characterized by carefulness in strategic decision-making, because of the fear 
of losing family control. This risk aversion makes family managers avoid adopting new 
management principles, because they consider them to be too risky.  
 
The socioemotional wealth approach (SEW) is another informative perspective to view 
the advantages and disadvantages of a family business. On one hand, there is a positive 
view regarding family ownership’s effect on growth, because family managers are very 
interested in the survival of the company (Miller et al., 2008) and have special features 
that make them unique (Stenholm, Pukkinen & Heinonen, 2016). On the other hand, there 
is a more negative view of the family business in which the difficulties come to prevail. 
In fact, family firms may have the capacity to grow but are unwilling to do so, because 
they are aware of the possible negative consequences for family control over the firm (De 
Massis et al. 2014; Casillas, Moreno & Barbero, 2010). The causes of this stagnation may 
be limited resources (Grassby, 2000), risk avoidance strategies (Allio, 2004), and internal 




Previous scholars report that family enterprises have special incentives to intentionally 
limit growth, even if they have the financial resources that are needed. The reason is that, 
for family owners, the business is more than a simple source of income. They also care 
about family employment, pride, and identity (Zellweger et al., 2013). The SEW collects 
all non-economic elements related to family participation in the company (for example, 
family control and influence, identification of family members with the company, binding 
social bonds, emotional attachment, renewal of family ties with the company through 
dynastic succession). Under this approach, avoiding the loss of SEW is the principal 
objective for family owners (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007). So, the concern for non-
economic factors will be greater for them, and they will always prioritize the protection 
of their socioemotional endowment (Garcés-Galdeano et al., 2016; Mahto et al., 2010). 
There is previous research that shows the distinct behaviour of CEOs’ strategic decision-
making in family firms compared to non-family firms (Garcés-Galdeano et al., 2017; 
Gomez-Mejía et al., 2007). For instance, Barth et al., (2005) examined the effect of 
owner-management on productivity in Norwegian small enterprises. They found 
significant differences in productivity. These differences could be explained by the 
management regime. Family firms run by professional managers were as productive as 
non-family-owned business, whereas those managed by owner managers were 
significantly less productive. 
 
Therefore, based on the previous literature, we would expect, in general terms, that family 
ownership decreases firm growth. They might favour risk-avoidance decisions in favour 
of firm survival, and such decisions can be harmful to firm growth (Gomez-Mejia et al., 




However, all of these findings about growth in small family firms should be rethought 
and revised when we refer to the context of companies in the high and medium-high 
technology sectors. In this specific context, there is extraordinary competition, and many 
companies do not consider the dilemma between slow or accelerated growth because the 
only way to survive is to grow as much as possible. In the high-tech sectors, growth is the 
unequivocal sign that technology is suited to the needs and expectations of customers 
whether they are final consumers or other companies. Although the competition is intense, 
these companies often operate in immature markets where there are many opportunities 
for growth such as great innovations in products and processes, new markets, and new 
needs for customers. For this reason, we wonder whether there are differences in growth 
between family and non-family businesses in this context of small technology-based 
companies or whether the presence of family members in management positions affects 
firm performance.  
 
 
The role of the CEO membership 
Although academic literature has generally treated family businesses as a whole, 
academics have recently started to acknowledge that not all family firms may place the 
same emphasis on SEW (Chua et al., 2015; Cruz et al., 2014; Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 
2014). For instance, Miller and Le Breton-Miller (2014) argue that there are two types of 
SEW priorities: restricted and extended. They postulate that restricted SEW is focused on 
family priorities and could run counter to the firm and the interests of non-family 
stakeholders. On the contrary, extended SEW would be focused on the long run and on 
the family, the business, and on all its stakeholders at the same time. Thereby, it is 
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necessary to distinguish situations that can lead to higher or lower SEW. In other words, 
the relevance of SEW dimensions may change across different types of family firms. A 
recent framework based on SEW has integrated the mixed gamble concept and suggests 
that family firms make decisions as a mixed gamble by assessing possible gain and loss 
outcomes (Bauweraerts, et al. 2019; Bromiley, 2009). In this sense, most decisions would 
imply a difficult trade-off for family decision-makers (Kotlar et al., 2018) who typically 
balance possible gains and losses in terms of economic and SEW goals (Alessandri et al., 
2018). 
 
From the academic field, it has been established that one of the most important sources 
of heterogeneity lies in the fact that family members occupy upper echelon positions 
(Hambrick & Mason, 1984). In particular, family firms can be managed by a family CEO 
or a non-family CEO.  
 
Prior empirical studies suggest that family owners’ emphasis on SEW is amplified when 
family owners appoint the CEO and other top executives based on personal relationships, 
thereby forming agreements by reason of kinship and not for full competition (Cannella 
et al., 2014; Cruz et al., 2010; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2001) and decision-making authority 
(Bertrand & Schoar, 2006; Carney, 2005). Therefore, we expect the influence of family 
ownership through family owners’ emphasis on family control and influence to become 
stronger when the CEO is a family member. Concentration of power provides a family 
CEO with particularly strong bargaining power (Connelly et al., 2010; Hambrick & 
Mason, 1984). Family CEOs are often closely and intimately associated with their 
businesses for a long time. Thus, family CEOs would be more willing to take care of these 
non-economic goals.  
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However, CEOs not related to the family will have little motivation to avoid losses of the 
SEW of the company. Instead, they will be more motivated to improve the company’s 
performance and look for growth opportunities. This occurs because these goals are 
related to the CEO’s personal objectives such as reputation, promotion, and remuneration 
(Garcés-Galdeano and García-Olaverri, 2019). The need to attract external professional 
talent for family firms’ survival and growth is so important that it is key to know what the 
differences between family and non-family CEOs are and how these differences affect 
CEOs’ strategy (Hauswald et al., 2015).  
 
Non-family CEOs working in family firms have, in general, a different vision of the 
company from those of family CEOs. The latter have among their objectives maintaining 
the values and the role of the family in the company. While non-family CEOs have 
economic goals linked to growth or better performance, family CEOs are more likely to 
address the goals of preserving family values over economic goals (Berrone et al., 2010). 
This does not mean that family managers do not pursue good results, it simply means that 
their priorities are different. If the vision, objectives, and priorities are different, so are 
the management decisions. For instance, as Wennberg et al. (2011) pointed out, when the 
main objective of the family owners is to transmit the business to the next generation, 
long-term stability will be a priority and decisions that put the future of the company at 
risk will be avoided. In this situation, non-economic objectives guide the decisions of 
managers and lead them to develop a management style that is focused on stability and 
survival rather than growth. This way of managing, in which the survival goal prevails 
over the growth goal, is present in the values of many managers of small companies 
(Wiklund et al., 2003).  
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These arguments are in accordance with the negative effects of agency theory in family 
firms, in which family managers are taken from a much more restricted pool of talent. 
According to Coleman (1990) and Burkart et al. (2002), this situation generally leads to 
a lower quality among family CEOs and may be detrimental to the productivity of the 
firms.  
Based on the aforementioned arguments and seeing that within a family business there 
may also be differences depending on whether the CEO is family member or not, we will 
distinguish three types of companies. On one hand there are family businesses with a 
family CEO, and on the other hand there are family businesses with a non-family CEO, 
and finally there are companies managed by non-family members. We anticipate that 
while both family and non-family CEOs in family firms look for socioemotional wealth 
creation, non-family CEOs will give greater weight to firm growth than family CEOs. 
Thus, in terms of growth, we believe that family businesses with non-family CEOs are 
more similar to non-family companies. Therefore, we hypothesize that small family firms 
managed by family CEOs would be firms with less firm growth. 
 
H1. Family firms managed by family CEOs show a negative influence on firm growth 
compared to the other two groups.  
 
The relationship between a non-family CEO and TMT composition 
 
As we previously hypothesized, family CEOs could have an adverse effect on 
performance in family firms (Pérez-Gonzáles, 2006). However, non-family CEOs may 
be more reticent than family CEOs to desire using firm resources to preserve the 
socioemotional endowment of the owning families (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007, 2011). 
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They are more apt to focus on economic performance than socioemotional wealth and 
less likely to be emotionally influenced by family issues. In addition, non-family CEOs 
have more expertise (Bennedsen et al., 2007) and bring more objectivity to the decision-
making process (Huybrechts et al., 2013). Therefore, they make changes imposed by the 
complicated context in which they are struggling (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2013). In other 
words, non-family CEOs may promote company growth both by contributing with more 
expertise and by diminishing the potential negative effect of family socioemotional 
wealth and agency costs (Miller et al., 2013; Daily & Dollinger, 1992).  
 
Notwithstanding the first hypothesis, there is some indication in the literature which 
suggests that the benefits of employing nonfamily CEOs is contingent on context. 
Villalonga and Amit (2006) show a combination between a nonfamily CEO and a family 
chairperson of the board optimizes firm performance. Miller et al. (2014), however, find 
that firms with family and non-family co-CEOs tend to underperform when compared 
with firms with only a non-family CEO. Moreover, Sciascia and Mazzola (2008) 
demonstrate that a non-family CEO leads to improved firm performance despite possible 
goal misalignment. Therefore, several notable studies add nuance to these findings and 
indicate that a proper balance of family and non-family members improves firm 
performance. 
Our suggestion is that non-family CEO effectiveness will be moderated by the 
composition of the TMT. Particularly, this will depend on whether there are family 
members in the TMT.  
 
The power of top managers plays a key role in strategic decision-making (Finkelstein, 
1992). In particular, they highlight the importance of family affiliation as an antecedent 
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to power in top management teams. Family TMTs frequently act as a “unique agent in 
which both ownership and management are concentrated, determining a personalization 
of authority that gives family members extremely high power and legitimacy within the 
organization” (De Massis, Frattini, Pizzurno, & Cassia, 2015a, p.4). This high level of 
family control means that the company prioritizes its own non-economic interests. 
Without formalized management practices or bureaucratic constraints, family TMTs 
could head interesting projects that would improve future growth. In addition, the family 
TMTs have more close connections within the family business. They know their clients 
and the market even before their employment in the family business; so, they have 
profound in-depth knowledge (Kellermanns & Eddleston, 2007).  
 
However, this discretion and power would be different depending on the CEO and 
whether he or she is a family or non-family member of the firm. On one hand, in addition 
to a family CEO, a family TMT may better grasp the family’s goals and perspectives. 
Generally, appointing a family member to the top management team promotes more 
family members to participate in family governance, providing different points of view 
and representing more non-economic interests. In this scenario, firm management is more 
strongly driven toward the attainment of SEW goals. 
On the other hand, the relationship of a non-family CEO with the firm is often more 
utilitarian (Lubatkin, Schulze, Ling, & Dino, 2005) and conflicts of interests with the 
TMT in relation to business expansion could be a problem. According to Miller and Rice 
(1988), non-family CEOs could go in search of growth objectives, but family top 
managers could cause relationship conflicts. In these types of situations, agency problems 
arise because of the different preferences between the CEO and the top management team. 
The list of possible conflicts is long: discrepancies over the control of the company and 
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the position occupied by family members, differences in business goals (e.g., international 
expansion), and different priorities on financial aspects. Growth may lead to problems 
among members of the family and among members of the management team, depending 
on their belonging or not belonging to the family. All this can affect the survival of the 
firm (Kellermanns & Eddleston, 2007, 2004; Jehn, 1997). In the long term, this 
conflicting relationship between growth and survival can lead the family owner to slow 
down growth goals. 
 
Therefore, non-family CEOs may not always outperform. A non-family CEO may be 
forced to share power with the family members on the TMT, and the CEO's discretion to 
act in the best interest of the company is likely to be restricted. This non-family CEO 
must now take into account the priorities of other family executives. That is, he or she 
must meet the SEW objectives, because they preserve the preferences of the family 
members in the TMT. Families that hire an external CEO but keep some family member 
in the TMT are suggesting that they will not give up the SEW perspective. They do not 
want to lose their control and their legacy. They need to grow, but they do not renounce 
socioemotional wealth goals.  
Moreover, the unity of the company could enter into crisis when the agency problem 
arises; that is, when the non-family CEO has to share power with other family members 
due to conflicts between family-centric and business agendas.  
Based on these arguments, we propose that in small, high, and medium-high tech firms: 
H2. In family firms, those managed by non-family CEOs with a family TMT will show a 
negative influence on firm growth. 
 
Generational stage of family CEOs 
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In recent years, the academic literature has addressed the impact of the generational stage 
on firm performance (Casillas et al., 2010; Cruz & Norqvist, 2010) from different 
perspectives. 
The agency perspective has been used to analyse managerial behaviour in the succession 
literature (Giambatista et al., 2005). Fama & Jensen, (1983) already announced the fact 
that family businesses were less exposed to agency costs, but this does not mean that they 
do not exist. Agency problems do occur in family businesses, and they can increase when 
these firms develop over generations. Some authors pointed that many of these problems 
arise because of increasing family conflicts and dysfunctional altruistic behaviour when 
the next generation starts leading the company. A study of Schulze et al. (2003) showed 
that in a sibling partnership, the level of ownership dispersion is high, and this can result 
in a more risk averse behaviour and eventually lead to a reduction in firm growth. In first 
generation managed companies, authority is highly concentrated because the founder 
both owns and manages the firm, thus there is a moderate agency problem. When the 
family grows and different individuals united by ties of blood take responsibility, the 
authority is diluted (Cruz & Nordqvist, 2012) and agency problems could become deeper. 
Compared to the second and subsequent generations, the founder of the company has 
more power and authority (Mitchell, Hatt, Valcea & Towsend, 2009), and this power 
concentration of authority promotes a greater entrepreneurial orientation (Chrisman, 
Chua & Steier, 2003) and growth. 
 
Furthermore, when power is highly concentrated in the founder family, it is reasonable to 
expect less reliance on formalized management practices, as these would inhibit the 
family owners’ freedom (Carney, 2005). Formalization is a form of control over the 
individual behaviours of managers and objectifies decision-making. Scholars have long 
17 
 
recognized that formalization obstructs openness, which is needed to see new outside 
opportunities (e.g., Jansen et al., 2006). As family owners put greater emphasis on control, 
they are likely to relax formalization so that the efforts of key decision makers can be 
directed towards expanding aspects of the external environment, producing greater 
opportunities for growth. 
 
From the SEW perspective, the generation that is leading the company may also have a 
different balance between economic and non-economic objectives. In the new 
generations, the objectives and interests can be very different. They can even come into 
conflicts (Ward, 1997) that affect their strategic decisions, including growth. For instance, 
Cannella et al. (2015) argue that lone-founder firms embrace an individualistic and 
entrepreneurial identity that focuses on innovation and economic opportunities and align 
with the traditional shareholder-wealth maximization goals.  
 
In addition, delving deeper into the SEW perspective, the importance of the different 
dimensions of the SEW can change among family businesses. When we talk about the 
first generation, we refer to entrepreneurs who want to leave the company to their children 
in the best possible condition. Therefore, although their priority is to keep control of the 
company in their own hands, they also worry about improving the competitiveness of 
their companies. They are looking for new markets and trying to improve the efficiency 
of the company, so they are more open to risk. However, the objectives of the managers 
who have received the company from their relatives, may not seek much growth but 
survival. They could be more risk averse. They feel the responsibility to keep the company 
alive and to take care of the legacy that they received from previous generations. In this 




Thus, based on these arguments, we suggest that, in the context of small high and 
medium-high technology firms, growth would be higher in first generation-managed 
firms than in second and subsequent generation-managed firms. 
H3: Founder-led family firms will have better firm growth than descendant-led family 
firms 
Figure 1 shows the sequence followed by hypothesis.  
-----------------------------------INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE ------------------------------------- 
 
3. Methods 
1.  Sample collection  
The data used in this research is a representative sample of small Spanish firms belonging 
to high and medium-high technology companies in the service sector as well as in the 
manufacturing industry. To obtain the sample, we used the SABI database that provides 
relevant information on 1,570,000 Spanish companies.  
Our focus was to create a sample of 1,500 small firms with less than 50 employees who 
develop their primary activity in high or medium-high technology sectors (manufacturing 
or service industries). For this purpose, we employed the classification of the OECD and 
the National Statistical Office (INE).1  
                                                          
1
 See www.ine.es/daco/daco42/daco4217/lstsectcnae.xls for a list of high and medium-
high technology industry sectors. 
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The company in charge of carrying out the survey selected a sample of 10,565 firms with 
the characteristics mentioned. The sample selection process was made randomly and took 
into account the representativeness of the industrial sectors, the legal form of the firm, 
and size strata. With a confidence level of 95 percent, the sampling error was ± 2.34 
percent. The companies were chosen at random within each industry sector using 
computer-aided telephone interviewing software.  
Interviews were conducted in 2010 by interviewers from a company specializing in 
surveys and market research. Interviewers received prior training on some relevant 
concepts of the survey. From the sample of 10,565 companies, more than 10,200 
companies were contacted. Of these, 1,485 agreed to participate; so a 14.5 percent 
response rate was achieved. The CEO of the company was responsible for responding to 
the questionnaire. We interviewed the CEO because the CEO has the broadest perspective 
of the company (Cycyota, et.al, 2002). The interviews lasted approximately half an hour. 
Missing values reduced the sample to 1,397 firms. In terms of size, industrial sector, or 
legal form, there were no differences between firms that agreed to participate and those 
who refused.  
In order to avoid problems of common method bias, different response formats for the 
measurement of the variables were applied (zero-to-ten scale, five-point Likert scale, 
seven-point Likert scale, dummy variables, etc.). Nonetheless, we conducted the 
Harman’s Single Factor Test. The results indicate that there is no problem of common 
method bias (the shared variance of 0.21 is far from the 0.50 threshold). 





Being aware of the importance of some aspects such as size, industrial sector or intensity 
of competition on growth, we sought to limit variability by focusing on a more 
homogeneous group of companies: companies of a similar size with the same 
technological complexity and with the same geographical origin. 
The main reason why we choose this small firm sample is that there is a widespread 
concern about the low survival of this type of company and the difficulties for growth in 
those that do survive. This problem is on the agenda of public decision-makers in Spain, 
because, as we have pointed before, Spain is the country in the OECD with the second 
lowest survival rates of its SMEs. Moreover, firm growth does not have the same 
importance in all industrial sectors. The technology-based companies demonstrate a 
slightly differentiated behaviour. The official data places the survival rate of technology-
based companies (TBC) at higher levels than for other companies. In addition, for the 
TBC that survive, the employment growth rate is clearly higher than in other sectors 
(Fariñas & Huergo, 2015). This is why, in addition to small companies, we also focused 
on technology-based companies. 
 
2.  Variables measurement 
Dependent variable 
Employment growth: There is no consensus in the current literature on how to measure 
growth, and previous researchers have used several different measures. For example, 
growth of sales, employees, assets, profit, equity, and others have been used (Davidsson 
& Wiklund, 2000; Šarlija, Pfeifer, Jeger & Bilandžić, 2016; Weinzimmer et al., 1998). In 
addition, qualitative features such as market position, quality of product, and customer 
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goodwill have also been used. We choose employment growth because it is especially 
important in the context of small companies competing in sectors of medium high and 
high technology. As Davidsson et. al, (2010, p.6) pointed out: “high tech companies with 
rather long development times are not able to display any growth in sales or revenues for 
long periods of time. Yet, during this period they might still grow in terms of assets— 
including knowledge assets such as patents—and employment”. 
In this work, we opted for relative variation in employment in the last three years as a 
measure of growth. In particular, we used information on the size of the current workforce 
(full-time workers) and the same indicator from three years ago. The variable used 
measures the relative rate of employment variation. It is a continuous variable that is 
expressed in percentages.  
Independent variables 
Family firm (FF): There is no single definition of a family firm, because it depends on 
the degree of family involvement. Consistent with previous researchers (e.g., Gomez-
Mejia et al. 2001; Gomez-Mejia et al. 2010) and considering the sample size, we 
established that a company is a family firm when the respondent confirms that there is a 
family member that directly or indirectly controls more than 50% of the company’s 
shares, and at least one family member is on the board of the directors.  
Family CEO (FCEO): A main focus in our work is to analyse whether the fact that the 
CEO belongs to the family or is an external professional has different effects on the 
company’s growth. The academic literature indicates that family CEOs have generally 
been found to underperform compared to outside managers, both in terms of managerial 
capabilities (Bloom & Van Reenen, 2007) and firm performance (Villalonga & Amit, 
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2006). In the survey, the respondent had to answer a question about this aspect. In our 
sample, 620 are family firms of which 55.1% are run by a family CEO. 
Family Top Management Team (TMT): The presence of family members on the top 
management team, other than the CEO, is used in this paper as an indicator of the degree 
of family involvement in the company. There is a question in the survey related to this 
point. The variable FTMT takes the value of 1 if any member of the family belongs to the 
top management team, other than the CEO, and the value of 0 otherwise.  
First generation: According to Gomez Mejia (2007), depending on which generation of 
the family the owner belongs, different importance is given to both economic and SEW 
goals. If we focus on CEOs who belong to the family, we can distinguish between family 
firms in which the CEO is the founder (first generation = 1) and those where the CEO 
belongs to the second or subsequent generations; that is, the CEO is a descendant of the 
founder (first generation = 0). 
Control variables 
To isolate the influence of family issues (CEO membership, family members in the top 
management and generation) on firm growth, we included several control variables. 
Following the integrative model of Wiklund et al. (2009) to explain firm growth, we 
propose three types of control variables: those related to human capital, the company, and 
the industry environment. 
Related to CEO 
CEO Education: What is the highest level of education that the CEO has achieved? This 
information was provided through an ordered variable ranging from 1 (the lowest) to 5 
(the highest).  
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CEO internal experience: This variable measures the number of years that the respondent 
was CEO of the current firm. One quarter of those interviewed spent less than five years 
as a company CEO, and only nine percent of them have worked as a CEO for 25 years or 
more.  
 
Related to the company 
 
Underfunded (UF): Whatever the ownership of the company, access to credit in order to 
have sufficient financing has been suggested (Cooper & Gimeno-Gascon, 1992) to be a 
determinant of growth. The variable underfunded (UF) measures whether or not the 
availability of capital has represented a systematic disadvantage in the development of 
the company. The answer to a question regarding this issue is measured on a five-point 
Likert scale in which 1 means total disagreement with scarce financing and 5 total 
agreement. 
Network: This variable seeks to capture the extent to which the company is immersed in 
a network of contacts. The variable is computed as the average of ten related questions 
given the importance of contacts with banks, clients, suppliers, employees, relatives, 
lawyers, adviser's office, and consultancy (up to a total of 10). Every item is answered on 
a five-point Likert scale. The Cronbach’s alpha of the Network indicator is 0.72.  
 Firm size (size): Due to economies of scale, firm size is a relevant factor that can affect 
firm growth. It was measured as the number of employees. 
 
Related to the industry environment 
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Service–Industry (service): The importance of economies of scale in the industrial sector 
leads to the expected growth being different in the service sector than in the 
manufacturing industry. Service is a dichotomous variable that takes values 1 or 0 for 
service companies or manufacturing industry firms, respectively. 
Technology change (Tech): The variable Tech measures the expectations of technological 
change in products or services. The variable is measured on a seven-point Likert scale, 
where the value 1 means that there are no changes, because the technology is well 
established; while 7 means very important technological changes and an evolving 
technology. 
 
3.3. Estimation method 
To analyse the effect of family involvement on the growth of the company, we estimated 
a general linear model where employment growth is the dependent variable. Hypothesis 
1 was tested taking into account all of the valid individuals in the sample (1,397 family 
and non-family firms). However, Hypothesis 2 was tested only for family firms. Finally, 
Hypothesis 3 was tested only for family firms managed by a family member CEO (342 
family CEO managed firms). Variance inflation factors indicate that our data are free of 
multicollinearity problems. All of the estimations have been carried out with robust 
standard errors, avoiding possible problems of heteroscedasticity.  
In order to ensure robustness of our results, Hypothesis 1, 2 and 3 were tested in a logit 
regression model where market share improvement is the dependent variable as a proxy 
of growth. The respondents were asked about the market share evolution over the last 3 
years. The variable is coded as 1 when they have remained the same or increased market 




Table 1 shows the structure of correlations of the variables as well as the mean and 
standard deviation of each variable in the whole sample and in each family of subsamples. 
Our sample is composed of 55.5% non-family companies; 24.5% are family businesses 
run by a family CEO and the remaining 20% are family firms managed by a professional 
CEO.  
-----------------------------------INSERT TABLE 1 HERE ------------------------------------- 
Employment variations are distributed around zero percent. The average value of the 
dependent variable, employment growth, is 0.025, which indicates a very slight rate of 
employment growth in the stage under consideration. However, there are large differences 
that can be seen in the standard deviation. In family firms, only one out of four has 
experienced an increase in their workforce in the last three years. Among them, the 
employment growth average has been 0.48. However, in non-family firms, one out of 
three of those have grown in employment, and the employment growth average is 0.63. 
A closer look at the correlation values shows significant correlations between independent 
variables and the dependent variable. It is important to note that all of the control variables 
have a significant correlation with the dependent variable, whether they are variables 
related to the CEO, the company, or the industrial environment.  
The first column of Table 2 examines the results for Hypothesis 1. Taking the group of 
non-family companies as a reference, we observe that there are significant differences 
with respect to family businesses managed by a family member. Employment has 
declined in these companies if we compare it with non-family companies (p=0.04). 
However, we do not find differences between family businesses managed by a non-family 
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CEO and non-family businesses. This supports our Hypothesis 1, and it is in accordance 
with the analysis of other authors where family CEOs prefer to be cautious and less risky 
because they are aware of the possible negative consequences of losing family control 
over the firm (Casillas, Moreno & Barbero, 2010). Therefore, although apparently firm 
growth has to be an important strategy for any CEO, family CEO priorities are different. 
Family CEOs avoid growing out of fear of losing control of the company. They opt for 
risk avoidance strategies to preserve their SEW (Allio, 2004).  
As expected, the variables Underfunded (UF), firm size, age, network or service have a 
significant impact on employment variation. Managing a bigger firm with no difficulty in 
accessing resources and a wide net of contacts will lead to employment growth. The 
negative sign of the CEO internal experience variable may be explained by the fact that 
younger CEOs, with less internal experience, may have more pressure to grow while those 
with more experience intend to maintain their market shares in a sustained manner. 
-----------------------------------INSERT TABLE 2 HERE ------------------------------------- 
To test our Hypothesis 2, we only focus on family firms. The second column of Table 2 
shows the results of the estimation.  
In this model, we have three categories of interest. On one hand, we have to look at 
NFCEO-FTMT, which reports the presence of a non-family CEO and family TMT. The 
variable has a negative and significant sign with a high coefficient. This means that 
although it seems that non-family CEO involvement positively influences firm growth 
when family members are in TMT, this effect is negative in comparison with the category 
of reference which is family firms that are managed by non-family CEOs and with non-
family TMT. It seems that for family firms, the best management leadership in terms of 
firm growth is to have professional CEOs and non-family members in the TMT. Thus, 
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this result is consistent with previous findings advocating for the positive effects of clear 
leadership alignments (Miller et al., 2014). Therefore, by delving deeper into family firms 
managed by non-family CEOs, we have shown that the positive effect of these non-family 
CEOs in terms of growth is even higher when there is an alignment of interests between 
the CEO and the TMT. Some of the control variables have lost significance, but they all 
maintain their sign, which gives an idea of the robustness of the results.  
On the other hand, we also have another category of interest in this model. This is FCEO, 
which reports the presence of a family CEO. This variable has a negative and significant 
sign. Thus, family firms with family CEOs, regardless of how the TMT is composed, have 
less growth than family firms with a professional CEO and non-family TMT.  
It would be great to see differences between family-managed firms with family and non-
family TMT, but our sample does not allow testing this. Due to the limitations of our 
sample, we only found four cases that are managed by a family CEO with non-family 
TMT and this cannot be representative of reality.  
Thus, our Hypothesis 2 is confirmed. The results offer us a broader vision of the 
possibilities of leadership within a family business. Going deeper in the analysis of family 
firms, Hypothesis 2 offers us a different view. In fact, the real differences among non-
family-managed firms came from the TMT composition. Among family firms, CEO 
identity is not enough to determine differences in growth. Adding the TMT composition, 
we are able to find that family firms will have higher growth when both the CEO and 
TMT are non-family members. According to the agency theory, if all of the members in 
the company have the same preferences, this translates into an improvement of results, 
which in this case is firm growth. 
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A different aspect of family involvement is addressed in Hypothesis 3. Taking into 
account only those companies managed by family CEOs, we analysed the possible 
influence on growth of the CEO being the founder of the company as opposed to being 
the successor in second or later generations. The last column of Table 2 shows the results 
of the estimation. The variable generation with a positive sign and p-value of 0.002 
confirms our hypothesis that if the CEO is the founder of a company, he or she has greater 
freedom of action and more authority over decisions than if he or she is a successor of the 
founder and there are other family members with different interests and varied visions of 
the company. Moreover, being the founder makes these CEOs more open to risky 
strategies, and since they are looking for new markets and trying to improve the efficiency 
of the company, they are more prone to risk. In addition, authority is totally centralized, 
so there are no agency problems. All of these characteristics lead to further employment 
growth. 
Finally, we performed further robustness checks of our results which are shown in Table 
3. In particular, we used another alternative measure of firm growth, market share. In this 
case, we used an alternative estimation technique, which is a logit regression model where 
market share improvement is the dependent variable. All of the results are robust to this 
different measure.  
-----------------------------------INSERT TABLE 3 HERE ------------------------------------- 
If we jointly observe the six regressions from table 2 and 3, we can see that the signs of 
the main control variables are maintained, which indicates the robustness of the models. 
The UF (underfunded) variable always has a negative sign, as expected for companies 
with financing problems. The size and establishment of networks as well as the 
expectation of technological change have a positive influence on growth. With regard to 
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the personal characteristics of the CEO, internal experience presents a negative and 
significant sign in the six regressions. This fact is particularly relevant in this context of 
high-tech companies. Managers who accumulate all of their experience in a single 
company and in the same sector do not guarantee faster growth. Such managers are more 
often members of family businesses.  
Although the dependent variables in the two estimated models capture very different 
aspects of a company's growth, the results are consistent and robust. We can conclude that 
our sample endorses the three hypotheses raised. 
5. Conclusion 
In this study, we aim to show the effect of family involvement on employment growth. 
Therefore, illuminating differences in growth between family and non-family firms and 
among different types of family firms leads to a better understanding of growth in small 
high-tech firms.  
The paper provides a better understanding of the type of companies with more flexible 
and less hierarchical structures: small companies in the high and medium-high technology 
sectors. As we have argued before, our sample of small firms is particularly suited to test 
our hypotheses given, among other things, the importance that owners’ and CEOs’ 
preferences have on strategic decision-making. But the sample of small firms is also 
important, because little evidence exists on the differences between family and non-
family controlled firms in companies of this size.  
The main contribution of this work is to highlight the relative advantages and the 
associated disadvantages of family involvement on firm growth in the context of Spanish 
small high-technology firms. 
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Our research questions were formulated based on a theoretical framework including two 
perspectives, that is, the agency theory and the SEW perspective. This approach allowed 
us to contribute to the existing knowledge resulting from previous studies on family 
business growth. 
We examined differences on growth in three types of firms, namely family-managed 
firms, non-family-managed but family-owned firms, and regular non-family firms. 
Moreover, we examined the crucial role of family involvement by considering the more 
nuanced effects of a family top management team and the generation of family control.  
The heterogeneity observed in the growth of small family businesses indicates that this 
cannot simply be explained by ownership. It is necessary to delve deeper into the different 
responsibilities and levels of involvement that the family has in the firm. That is why this 
paper analyses the different graduations of family involvement, from CEO membership, 
through the management team membership, to the generation of the family CEO. Our 
work provides empirical support for theories suggesting that the growth of small 
businesses is conditional on the type of ownership and the management regime. (Hart, 
2001). Therefore, in view of our results, an interesting question arises: which one of these 
two factors, management or ownership, is more important in determining firm growth? 
The results of our analysis have an impact on the fact that family businesses run by a non-
family CEO present growth results similar to those of non-family companies and far 
above those with family CEOs. In other words, the difference in growth is associated with 
the CEO's membership in the family and not only with the ownership.  
 
Regarding the first hypothesis, from the SEW perspective, we have shown that the 
preservation on socioemotional wealth could lead to lower employment growth. Family-
managed firms, where the CEO is part of the family, emphasize the “emotional” 
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protection goals over pure economics. In this sense, they prefer to protect their firm by 
avoiding taking risky decisions that could affect their control over the firm. As family 
CEOs give more importance to non-economic goals, we have shown that family-managed 
firms, in comparison to the other two categories (non-family-managed family firms and 
non-family firms), are less likely to achieve growth. These arguments are in accordance 
with the negative effects of agency theory in family firms. After all, professional CEOs 
are chosen from a larger pool of talent. Family CEOs may retain the position as top 
manager because they enjoy being in charge and manage their lifework, the family firm, 
in their own way. 
The second hypothesis suggests that the benefits of employing nonfamily CEOs is 
contingent on context. Our results show that non-family CEO effectiveness will be 
moderated if there are family members in the TMT. Families that hire an external CEO 
but keep some family member in the TMT do not give up the SEW perspective. They do 
not want to lose their control and their legacy. Moreover, the unity of the company could 
enter into crisis when agency problem arises, that is, when the non-family CEO has to 
share power with other family members. 
Therefore, these findings demonstrate that there is still a long way to go in terms of 
heterogeneity among family firms. CEO membership is not enough to distinguish 
differences between family firms. We need to go deeper into the composition of the TMT.  
Relating to the generation stage of the firm, we have shown that among family firms, firm 
growth will be higher in first generation than in subsequent generation. This could be 
because when family ownership is divided among several members, the authority is 
diluted and decision-making loses effectiveness. Family members compete for their 
preferences (Schulze et al., 2003), particularly in the presence of diverse goals (Kotlar & 
De Massis, 2013). Thus, compared to the second and subsequent generations, the first 
32 
 
generation has greater power and legitimacy that makes the decision making process 
easier and faster, which leads to greater firm growth. In addition, family firms often 
become more risk averse after succession (Kaye and Hamilton, 2004). As next-generation 
family members are often more concerned for wealth preservation than further wealth 
creation, this can result in a lower orientation toward firm growth. 
 
These results have been checked with two measures of firm growth: the variation in the 
number of employees and the evolution of the market share. There are many indicators 
that can approximate the polyhedral concept of firm growth. The employment growth 
must be understood as a growth in the inputs. The company that is successful or is 
developing new services and products is forced to increase its workforce. The 
improvements in the market share, on the other hand, should be interpreted as a measure 
of the growth in the outputs: a possible result of the increase in sales would be the 
presence in new markets or the improvement of the share in the markets in which we are 
already competing. Ultimately, this double measure leads us to ratify the importance of 
management in high-tech small businesses that have not only survived but have grown in 
two relevant dimensions. 
Practical Implications 
Our research also has some implications. Despite having analysed our research question 
in, a priori, a homogenous sample (small high-tech firms), having taken into account 
firm, individual, and industry control variables, the heterogeneity observed in the growth 
of small family businesses indicates that this cannot simply be explained by ownership. 
Thus, different combinations of family involvement were found to lead to different levels 
of firm growth.  
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This paper has also some implications for management practice. According with the 
results, it seems that the factor which mostly matters in terms of growth is the 
management status and not only the ownership.  
Family owners are surely very concerned with maintaining control of the company, 
because they believe that this is the best way to ensure that the firm will remain in the 
hands of their descendants. However, our work shows that if relevant positions are 
assigned to family members (CEO or TMT membership) in order to maintain control, that 
decision can slow down the growth of the company. Owners must explore other ways to 
maintain control of the company (for example through shareholders or the board of 
directors). If family owners hire family members to occupy managerial positions, perhaps 
they should establish requirements before assigning their relatives to positions of such 
responsibility. For example, they should demand certain training or educational level, 
managerial experience in other companies, or seniority in the company. If the family 
managers had similar characteristics to the externals (something that now does not happen 
since they have less training and no external management experience), it could be possible 
to avoid the negative effects of agency problems and they could preserve SEW values 
without harming the growth of the company.  
Another suggestion could be to recommend that family owners encourage their 
successors to have the entrepreneurial spirit. New business leaders should not be so 
worried about the inherited wealth. 
Our study highlights heterogeneity among growth in family firms. Based on the mixed 
evidence regarding the impact of family involvement on growth, scholars now should 
caution that comparing family and non-family firms’ firm growth might be insufficient 




Limitations and future research 
This work presents some limitations. Firstly, the data is cross-sectional which does not 
allow researchers to infer causal relationships or effects over time. Secondly, our sample 
is limited to Spanish firms. Therefore, any generalization relative to other contexts should 
be done cautiously. Thirdly, we have used employment growth in this study and market 
share to test robustness, but we call on other researchers to explore the issues analysed 
here with other dependent variables.  
Fourthly, one of our concerns was to detect which variables are associated with the 
survival and growth of Spanish companies with fewer than 50 workers in technologically 
advanced sectors. Due to the definition of the dependent variables (employment growth 
and market share evolution), our analysis focused on companies that have survived for at 
least 3 years. It would be very desirable to be able to carry out a similar study in order to 
analyse companies that do not survive and see if the presence of the family members in 
managerial positions has an influence on the survival of a company. Previous literature 
indicates that controlling families are more willing to accept lower performance and to 
resist short-term urges to sell or liquidate (DeTienne et al., 2013). This patient capital that 
is likely to sacrifice short-term performance to guarantee control and long-term survival 
of the firm is an asset of family firms as it allows the firm to navigate bad times for a 
longer period of time and therefore explore and exhaust all possible ways to recover 
(Capelleras, et al, 2020). In that sense, it would be curious to see if, in general, family 
businesses survive more or less. 
Fifthly, although it is true that we do not measure the socioemotional wealth in the paper, 
we can see how it is implicitly present in family businesses. It would be very interesting 
to have a good indicator that measures the degree of importance of SEW in these 
companies and as a consequence see the influence of SEW on growth. 
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Finally, a complementary way to measure the influence of the family would have been 
the percentage of ownership that the family has or the number of family members on the 
board of directors. However, neither of these two variables could be included in the 
model. Regarding the first one, this variable cannot be discriminatory because most of 
these small family businesses have more than 90% of the ownership in family hands. The 
second one could not be evaluated because small companies in the Spanish context do 
not have an obligation to have a formal board of directors. 
In conclusion, our empirical results show that firms managed by family-CEOs have less 
firm growth in comparison with the other two groups. They also suggest that non-family 
CEOs provide higher growth when there is no family member in the TMT. Finally, we 
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TABLE 1: Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Coefficients.  
CORRELATION MATRIX 
WHOLE  Sample 














Family CEO in 
FF Subsample  
N = 187 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Mean (sd) Mean (sd) Mean (sd) Mean (sd) 
1. Growth 1       0.025  (0.6) -0.026 (0.5) -0.080  (0.4) -0.050 (0.5) 
2. CEO Education 0.11* 1      3.24   (1.1) 3.06   (0.8) 2.87  (0.9) 2.64 (1.0) 
3. CEO Internal 
Experience 
-0.14* -0.33* 1     12.1   (8.5) 13.43 (9.3) 15.7  (9.4) 18.58 (9.5) 
4. UF -0.10* -0.03 -0.01 1    2.89   (1.5) 2.91  (1.5) 3  (1.5) 3.03 (1.5) 
5. NETWORK 0.06* -0.00 -0.06* 0.06* 1   2.74   (0.6) 2.78  (0.6) 2.85   (0.7) 2.82 (0.7) 
6. SIZE 0.13* 0.20* -0.05 -0.10* 0.02 1  21.07 (13.1) 22.0 (13.1) 20.45  (12.3) 19.67 (11.9) 
7. SERVICE 0.18* 0.19* -0.19* -0.03 0.02 0.04 1 0.29   (0.4) 0.20  (0.3) 0.15  (0.3) 0.21 (0.4) 
8. TECH 0.10* 0.13* -0.05 -0.00 0.04 0.05 0.21* 3.32   (2.1) 3.22  (1.9) 3.24  (2.0) 3.28 (2.0) 






Table 2: OLS Regression Analysis 
 
Significance levels are based on a two-tailed test +: p<0.1; *: p<0.05; **: p<0.01; ***: p<0.001. 
H1: Sample: Family and non-family firms. Reference group: non-family firms 
H2: Sample: Only Family firms. Reference group: Family firms with non-family CEO and non-
family TMT 








 H1 H2 H3 
 Growth Growth  Growth 
FCEO_FF -0.067 * -0.289 ***   
NFCEO_FF -0.043      
       
NFCEO-FTMT   -0.302 ***   
First Generation     0.152 ** 
       
Size 0.007 *** 0.006 *** 0.010 *** 
CEO Education 0.003  -0.012  -0.012  
CEO internal experience -0.003 *** -0.003 ** -0.004 ** 
UF -0.035 *** -0.039 ** -0.044 * 
Tech 0.007 * 0.028 ** 0.021 + 
Network 0.013  0.031  0.037  
Service 0.133 *** 0.076  -0.054  
       
N.obs.  1397  620  342  
F 19.58 *** 8.383 *** 7.278 *** 
R.Squared 0.133  0.110  0.149  
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Table 3: Robustness check: Logit Regression Analysis 
 
Significance levels are based on a two-tailed test +: p<0.1; *: p<0.05; **: p<0.01; ***: p<0.001. 
 H1 H2 H3 
 Market Share Market Share   Market Share 
FCEO_FF -0.263 + -0.660 +   
NF CEO_FF -0.180      
       
NFCEO-FTMT   -0.706 +   
First Generation     0.559 ** 
       
Size 0.035 *** 0.064 *** 0.075 *** 
CEO Education 0.076  -0.062  -0.048  
CEO internal experience -0.005  -0.013 ** -0.034 ** 
UF -0.210 *** -0.372 ** -0.481 *** 
Tech 0.054 + 0.068 ** 0.013  
Network 0.078  0.222  0.539 ** 
Service 0.591 *** 0.812 *** 0.787 + 
       
N.obs.  1352  597  327  
Log likelihood 1548,476 *** 618,957 *** 336,991 *** 
R.Squared 0.123  0.251  0.311  
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